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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES W. TAGGART, Trustee, a 
partnership, Salt Lake County, a body 
politic, First Security Bank of Utah, 
a Utah corporation, and Zions First 
National Bank, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT PARTNERSHIP'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 
10594 
Pursuant to Rule 76(e) U. R. C. P., the Appellant Part-
nership herewith petitions this Cour:t for a rehearing of the 
law issue underlying Point II of this Appeal. The Appellant 
urges that based upon the grounds set out in this Petition, 
seen in view of the facts of record and the accompanying 
Brief, the Court should reconsider its Opinion of July 10, 
1967, as to the second assignment of error, by ordering a 
rehearing of the same. 
This Petition is grounded upon the basis that with re-
spect to said Point II, the Opinion of the Court is, as a 
matter of law, mistaken in its conclusions that: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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(1) "The defendant made no offer of proof so we 
are unable to determine from the record before 
us what other matters counsel wished to pursue 
on that subject." 
(2) "Without a showing or an offer to prove similar-
ity of the Condas property with the subject prop-
erty, we are unable to say that the ruling of the 
Court was arbitrary and unreasonable." 
As to ground ( 1) , the record of trial evidences beyond 
reasonable contest that the import of the cross-examination 
(prohibited and stricken by the trial court) was clear from 
the very question, itself, thus eliminating the necessity for 
a formal offer of proof. As to ground (2), the record of 
trial will further evidence that a foundation and showing 
of similarity of the Condas property to the condemned 
property under consideration, was adequately made. 
Thus the Court can and should determine that the trial 
court ruling, which stopped the cross-examination on this 
key point, was "arbitrary and unreasonable" so as to sub-
stantially prejudice the Appellant and deny to it a full 
hearing in the matter. A new trial on the issues of Just 
Compensation should be ordered upon rehearing, the Ap-
pellant respectfully submits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
Partnership 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plain ti/ f and Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES W. TAGGART, Trustee, a 
partnership, Salt Lake County, a body 
politic, First Security Bank of Utah, 
a Utah corporation, and Zions First 
National Bank, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 
10594 
STATEMENT OF LEGAL POSITION 
It is not the aim of this petition to simply restate and 
urge again issues which have been submitted to and re-
solved by the Court in the appeal. Such is not the founda-
tion of the rehearing procedure and it will not be counten-
anced as a basis for a Petition. Salt Lake City v. Tellurwe 
Power Company, 82 Utah 622, 26 P. 2d 822 (1933); Pana-
gopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 215, 72 P. 2d 456 (1937). 
Rather, it is urged in this Petition that the Opinion of the 
Court of July 10, 1967, has overlooked or misinterpreted 
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material facts of record and has reached erroneous conclu-
sions of law relating to Appellant's second assignment of 
error, and upon which the judgment of the trial court is 
substantially upheld. The correction of those facts and 
conclusions on rehearing should result in a reversal of the 
trial court and the entry of an order of new trial on Just 
Compensation in the case. A petition for rehearing is prop-
erly made out on these grounds. Cummings v. Nielson, 42 
Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619 (1913); Venard v. Old Hickory 
Mining Co., 4 Utah 67, 6 Pac. 415 (1885). 
ARGUMENT 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT ERRONEOUS-
L Y C 0 N S 'T R U E S AND MISINTERPRETS 
FACTS AND LAW IN POINT II OF THE 
APPEAL. 
The full-fledge of facts involved in the Defendant's 
seoond assignment of error will not be recounted here, they 
having been set out at pages 21-22, 39-41 and 46-49 of De-
fendant's appeal Brief. In order that the gravity of the 
assignment be completely weighed, the court's attention is 
invited to a review of those pages of Defendant's Brief, as 
well as to the authorities cited and discussion given to the 
assignment of error, generally, at pages 39-49 of the Brief. 
Suffice to say that Point II of the appeal stems from 
the refusal of the trial court to permit the Defendant to 
cross-examine the last expert witness for the State, A. B. C. 
Johns, with respect to his prior but recent appraisal of the 
--
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Condas land abutting the condemned property. Johns had 
testified on direct-examination for the State, that the fair 
market value of the north section of the subject property 
condemned was $4,000.00 per acre (Tr. 800). Defendant's 
counsel, on cross-examination, asked the witness if he had 
not previously appraised the Condas property next door 
for $10,000.00 per acre, that appraisal having been made 
for the landowner (Tr. 843). The objedion of the State 
on the grounds of immateriality was sustained, the trial 
court remarking to the jury that while cross-examination 
of factors in nearby areas was normally proper, it was out-
weighed in this instance by the risks of introducing other 
issues which time did not permit (Tr. 842-844). 
The Opinion of this Court, in holding that prejudicial 
error was not committed by this limitation of cross-exam-
ination, states that: 
"The defen.:lant made no offer of proof so we 
are unable to determine from the record before us 
what other matters counsel wished to pursue on that 
subject. Without a showing or an offer to prove 
similarity of the Condas property with the subject 
property, we are unable to say that the ruling of the 
court was arbitrary and unreasonable." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Such holding is unfounded in law and unsupported by 
the facts of record and should be correctej by rehearing, 
the reasons being: 
1. The question underlying the assignment of 
error was leading, specific, pointed and by its na-
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ture, required no "offer of proof as to what other 
matters counsel wished to pursue". 
The key question, "that you appraised the Condas Piece 
for the landowner for $10,000.00 an acre", was not one of 
general inquiry. It did not pose an open question, such as 
[for what amount did you appraise the Condas property 
next door]. Had that been the nature of the question, De-
fendant's counsel would have been obligated, as the Court's 
Opinion suggests, to make an offer of proof as to what was 
intended to be shown. 
BUT THE QUESTION HEREIN WAS NOT OF 
THAT TYPE. Its nature was pointed, specific, leading and 
clear as to its effect. It seared the credibility of Mr. Johns' 
opinion as perhaps no other question could have properly 
done on cross-examination in the case. There can be no 
doubt in the minds of reasonable men as to what was to be 
shown by the question or what its effect was to be. And the 
trial court was not misled or unadvised that the question 
went to the heart of the bias, credibility and integrity of the 
witness (a witness whose answers to that point had been 
mostly clipped and indifferent). The question, ipso facto 
and in the light of earlier testimony both on direct and 
cross, unequivocally offered to prove that this witness, who 
had appraised the subject property at $4,000.00 per acre 
for the State Road Commission, had previously appraised 
abutting property (separated only by a fence) at $10,000.00 
an acre for the landowner, Condas. 
Under such circumstances, the prevaiilng rule is that 
an offer of proof to apprise the court of the matter to be 
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pursued, is unnecessary. Koppang v. Se'uier, 106 Mont. 79, 
75 P. 2d 790 (1938); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Doerksen, 
75 F. 2d 96 (loth Cir. 1935); Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44, 
3 A. 2d 313 (1938). The Idaho Supreme Court, in McKie 
v. Chase, 73 Ida. 491, 253 P. 2d 787, 793 (1953) put it this 
way: 
"In each instance, where the evidence offered 
by the plaintiffs was rejected by the court, the plain-
tiffs made formal offers of proof. However, such 
offers, under the circumstances, appear to be un-
necessary because the questions to which the objec-
tions were made were sufficient to indicate the per-
tinency, materiality and nature of the testimony 
sought." 
In 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error Sec. 604 at p. 70 
( 1962) the principle is affirmed : 
"The general rule that the trial court cannot be 
put in error in excluding evidence unless an offer of 
proof is made showing what the evidence or testi-
mony would have been if received, has been applied 
to preclude review of alleged error in excluding evi-
dence. However, the making of an offer of proof is 
not a condition of the right to a review of a ruling 
excluding evidence unless the nature of the evidenc~ 
intended to be elicited by the challenged question 
is not apparent." 
2. A sufficient foundation and showing was 
made to prove similarity of the Condas property 
with the subject property. 
The Opinion of the Court further states herein that 
the Defendant made no off er to prove similarity of the 
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Condas ground with the condemned property. The court's 
attention is invited to the following portions of the record 
of trial regarding the Condas property, all of which pro-
ceded the focal question : 
Beginning at Tr. page 827, line 14 
(By Def's counsel on cross-examination) 
Q. Mr. Johns, tell us, you have appraised prop-
erties in this area before, have you not? 
A. Yes, sir, I have. 
Q. And you have, as a matter of fact, ap-
praised a piece of property over here in the corner 
for a Mr. Condas whose property was also con-
demned by the Sttae Road Commission? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. But that was in connection with the Twen-
ty-first South Expressway, isn't that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that property wound up in a condem-
nation suit, isn't that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were called as a witness to testify 
in connection with your opinion as to the market 
value of the Condas piece, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Part of that Condas piece lay in a zone 
that was the same zoning as the north part of the 
subject property M-1, isn't that correct? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Lay in the County? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it had access to Redwood Road and it 
also had access to 2100 South Street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
And at Tr. 841, line 3. 
(Examination by Def's counsel) 
Q. And you have acquainted yourself, have 
you not, with the sales in the industrial area just 
across the street from the subject property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. U. S. Steel property for one? 
A. Yes. 
Q. We will talk about that one in a minute but 
in any event you have acquainted yourself over the 
last couple of years with other sales in the industrial 
center, in the interior of the industrial center as well 
as those on Redwood Road, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And as a matter of fact, you took some of 
those sales into consideration in appraising this 
piece of property for the Condas's, did you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In fact, you went up into - you appraised 
this for the Condas's. You went to the 1700 South 
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area to the sale of the Kameral areas for $17,000 an 
acre or something? 
A. As I recall. 
* * * 
Tr. 842, line 3 
Q. You took into consideration the William-
son sale up on Redwood Road and the Overmeyer 
sale? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you went clear up to Ninth South in 
appraising the Condas tract? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the Condas tract abutted upon the 
Gedge tract, didn't it, immediately south? 
A. I don't recall. It probably did. 
Q. The Gejge tract, before part of it was 
taken for the expressway, it abutted immediately 
on the Condas land? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Same zoning, wasn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that Condas piece was immediately 
east of the M-2 property, isn't that correct, in the 
subject property? 
A. I don't think it extended - did it actually 
touch? I don't recall. 
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Q. It was in the same proximity? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had the same proximity on the Pole Line 
Road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You testified in that condemnation case on 
behalf of the land owner, didn't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You recall the - you testified the fair 
market value of $10,000 -
MR. NOV AK: Objection, your Honor. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I have the right, I think, 
to state my question - that you appraised that 
Condas piece for the landowner for $10,000 an acre? 
MR. NOV AK: I object, your Honor, on the 
ground that it is immaterial and I move the remarks 
of counsel be stricken. That is not material to any 
issue in this case as to what he might have appraised 
another piece of property for. 
All of the testimony referred to above was received 
as a part of the evidence in the trial devoted exclusively to 
unimproved property, industrial in this instance, and under 
conditions where the trial court had admitted as comparable 
sales, property more than ten city blocks distant from the 
subject land. (See Johns' testimony on direct, Tr. 775, 782, 
788). 
Thus the record of trial shows without reasonable dis-
pute, that with respect to the Condas property, it was next 
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door to the subject land, it had the same use and zoning a::; 
the subject property, it possessed the same access to 2100 
South Street and Redwood Road as did Taggart, the Johns' 
appraisal of the Condas property mas made at a time within 
reasonable proximity to the value date of the subject prop-
erty, and that the witness had appraised both Condas and 
the subject under the same standard, fair market value and 
had utilized the same comparable sales. What essential ele-
ment needs to be added to prove reasonable similarity be-
tween the two properties? None, it is submitted. Certainly, 
under the test announced by this Court in State of Utah v. 
Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953), Southern Pacific 
Company v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960), 
Weber Basin Water Conserv. Dist. v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 
347 P. 2d 862 (1959), State Road Comm. v. Woolley, 15 U. 
2d 248, 390 P. 2d 860 (1964), and the leading case, State 
Road Comm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961), 
the foundational requirements of comparability were met 
in the Condas evidence. Undoubtedly, they could have been 
more elaborate, but as made, they were reasonably suffi-
cient and adequate to advise the trial court and this Court 
of the nature and factors surrounding the comparable prop-
erty. 
True enough, the issue of similarity or comparability 
is one initially for the trial judge as a preliminary ques-
tion of law. State Road Commission v. Peterson, supra. 
If the property appears to the court to be within the area 
of reasonable oomparison to the condemned tract, the testi-
mony is to be received. The weight to be accorded it is a 
jUJ:'Y matter. State of Utah v. Peek, supra. But the trial 
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court herein was not at all worried about the comparability 
test. Indeed, the court's remarks, upon sustaining the 
State's objection, necessarily implied that Condas was simi-
lar to the subject ground (Tr. 843-844). Nor was there 
any objection ever made by the State to the question posed, 
on the basis of lack of foundation. 
It is respectfully and earnestly submitted that contrary 
to the opinion of July 10, a review of the record will reveal 
that an adequate foundation was made to show reasonable 
similarity of the Condas property, thus enabling this Court 
to say that the exclusionary ruling was arbitrary, unreason-
able, and prejudicial to the Defendant. 
3. The ruling of the trial court was prejudicial to 
the Defendant's guaranty to a full and fair trial. 
Although the opinion of the court does not pass di-
rectly on the issue, the implication from the language is 
that the exclusionary ruling of the lower court was error, 
but that because of the claimed lack of foundation and an 
offer or proof, the issue of whether the ruling was preju-
dicial could not be determined. The law of the case1 leaves 
little to doubt that the .stopping of cross-examination herein 
was error. Bingaman v. City of Seattle, 139 Wash. 68, 245 
Pac. 411 (1926); Contra Costa County v. East Bay Munic. 
Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1960); Basch v. Iowa Power and 
Light, 95 N. W. 2d 714 (Iowa 1959); People v. Murata, 326 
P. 2d 94 7 (Cal. 1958). For this case, as well as for prece-
dent value, it is respectfully submitted that on rehearing, 
the Court should state that the trial court ruling did consti-
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tute error and then address itself to the issue of whether 
the error was prejudicial. 
The error was prejudicial. It deprived the Defendant 
of the full sweep of cross-examination of the key expert for 
the Government. Nothing is gainsaid by the observation 
that a land evaluation expert, experienced as he is in the 
art of rendering testimony, is the most difficult type of 
witness to effectively dispute on cross-examination. Every 
measure within reason should be extended to counsel in his 
attempt to place such a witness in the rightful setting.1 But 
more than that, the ruling of the trial court herein took 
away from the Defendant its chief attack upon the credi-
bility and bias of Mr. Johns, an attack which, as evidenced 
by the record, constituted a substantial portion of the cross-
examination. The foundational questions regarding the 
Condas tract as quoted-above, were pursued by Defendant 
without State objection, and were all keyed to the very 
question which the trial court refused to allow. Not only 
was the Defendant prohibited by the ruling from explor-
ing the reason, if any, why Johns had made inconsistent 
appraisals for different clients (one a condemnor and an-
other a condemnee) on the same class of ground, but De-
fendant was as well prohibited in closing argument from 
1In ordering a new trial, this court said in State of Utah v. Peek, 1 
U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953): 
"There is no other instrument so well adapted to dis-
covery of the truth as cross-examination, and as long as it 
tends to disclose the truth, it should never be curtailed or 
limited. Any inquiry should be allowed which an individual 
about to buy would feel it in his interests to make." 
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drawing to the jury's attention, the obvious bias and dis-
credit which the question reasonably portrayed. 
And it is the very testimony of Mr. Johns on the value 
before the acquisition, upon which the legal validity of the 
jury interrogatories depends. The interrogatory of the 
jury as to the value of the total property before condemna-
tion was $106,709.00 below that value estimate of all other 
witnesses. Only Mr. Johns' estimate was lower than the 
jury interrogatory, by some $334,000.00. But for Johns' 
appraisal of the subject property before condemnation, the 
verdict is without the range of the testimony, and as a 
matter of law, would be set aside or subject to additur 
procedure. Weber Basin Conservancy District v. Moore, 2 
U. 2d 254, 272 P. 2d 176 (1954). 
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CONCLUSION 
A rehearing should be ordered to review the second 
assignment of error and treatment given to it by the Opin-
ion of July 10. Respectfully, it is submitted that said Opin-
ion should be found erroneous in that regard, that it be 
held that an offer of proof was unnecessary as to the na-
ture of the Con,ias inquiry, and that there was a sufficient 
showing of similarity of the Condas ground with the subject 
property. 
Upon rehearing, the Court should determine and state 
that the cross-examination ruling was clear error and that 
it was prejudicial to the Defendant's rights to a full and 
fair hearing. A new trial on Just Compensation should be 
thereupon ordered, it is respectfully submitted. 
Respectfully, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
Partnership 
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